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 2 
Introduction 
This paper uses an ideas-centered approach to offer an answer to a rarely asked yet 
interesting question in the context of postcommunist politics: what happened with the set of 
lived Marxist ideas which once dominated the policy making process? The ideational answer 
is based on the observation that there are more than one ways for ideas to affect politics and 
policies. It is true, that ideas are important when a policymaker believes in them – given a set 
of available options, she will naturally choose the one that most closely corresponds to her 
ideas. But it is also true that ideas are important when they shape the set of available options 
itself as well as the possible outcomes. It is precisely this second way for ideas to affect 
politics which is explored here, and behind the puzzle of Marxism’s disappearance an 
analytical story is found that may lead to better appreciation of the sometimes subtle and 
subterraneous ways in which ideas affect politics. 
By the mid-1990s Marxism disappeared completely from the public discourse in 
Bulgaria. None of its postulates, its main policy recommendations such as central planning, 
completely administratively controlled prices, obligatory employment, state property, 
collectivism, proletarian dominance through one-party rule, is left standing. The occasional 
appearances of the chairman of the tiny Bulgarian Communist Party in pre-election TV spots 
sound and look so off-beat and aloof, that they only prove the fact that the Marxist discourse 
has no place whatsoever in the present day Bulgarian public debates. 
It has been effectively substituted by a broad range of variants of a market-capitalistic 
talk, which has come to completely dominate the Bulgarian public space.i No one questions 
the necessity of private property and initiative, markets (at least to some extent), different 
political parties, competition. Debates and differing opinions are strictly within the realm of 
market democracy, and evolve around the choice of one or another set of institutions and 
policies which can make this specific system of social organization work best in Bulgaria. 
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The vanishing act of Marxism in Bulgaria came on the back of more than forty years of 
complete and unchallenged domination. During socialism in Bulgaria there were no 
alternatives to the Marxist-communist set of ideas in either public discourse, academic work, 
or policy formulation and implementation. If there were any internal arguments and 
oppositions, they were strictly within the ideological realm of the centrally planned, state-
owned one-party system of social organization. 
The complete dominance of Marxism in Bulgaria for more than forty years up to 1989, 
and its complete vanishing from the public discourse within several years after 1989 begs the 
question: is it possible for a rich set of ideas which have been actually practiced and lived for 
almost half a century by a given society, to disappear without a trace within a fleeting 
moment? If human societies evolve in a complex path-dependant way along a continuum, 
such sharp discontinuities should not happen. 
The only way to reconcile the seeming contradiction is to notice that the fact that the 
Marxist views have left the public discourse does not mean that they have left people’s minds. 
It is to be expected that, even if they are no more at the fundament of policy formation and do 
not explicitly inform the social decision making process, remnants of the previously dominant 
set of ideas can still be found in the thinking of many representatives of the previously 
communist society. 
The paper illustrates the general argument by outlining the possible significance of one 
such remnant in one particular country. More precisely, it is an attempt to demonstrate how 
the survival into postcommunism of one of the pillars of Marxist economic theory can offer a 
ready and logical explanation to several oddities associated with the process of economic 
transition and policies in Bulgaria. 
The argument developed below rests on two assumptions. The first is that the cognitive 
process of a person and of societies as a whole involves a complex mapping of perceived facts 
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on a set of existing adopted explanations, or theories, about reality and about the causal links 
which exist in it. One of the reasons why the mapping is complex is that it is a two way street 
– while it is true that facts and observations do affect the set of adopted explanations, it is also 
true that the a-priori adopted explanations do affect what facts are perceived and how they are 
perceived, and especially the inferences that are made by the respective agents. The 
importance of this assumption for the argument in the paper is that the complexity of the 
social cognitive process means two things. First, severe and prolonged discrepancies between 
objective developments in a given economy and the perceptions and judgments of economic 
agents about these developments are entirely possible and can be rational. Second, a good 
place to look for explanation of such severe and prolonged discrepancies is the starting, or 
inherited, ideas of the respective economic agents about the world, because they are the other, 
besides observed facts, major determinant of perceptions. 
The second assumption, which is admittedly simplistic, is that in the case of the 
Bulgarian postcommunist society, there are two basic alternative generalized sets of ideas, 
which are available to economic agents and respectively shape their perceptions and 
inferences. The first set consists of ideas inherited from the past, centered around a long 
intellectual tradition of etatism, collectivism, egalitarianism, dislike of capitalism, and 
suspicion towards the markets and their outcomes.ii The second set of ideas is the one to 
which the Bulgarian society was exposed, for the first time in anything resembling a 
significant degree, after the fall of communism and the beginning of democratic and market 
reforms. It is ultimately based on the belief that under a proper institutional framework 
voluntary market interaction between independent individuals with private initiative produces 
desirable efficient results. 
For the purpose of operationalization of the analysis in the paper, this second 
assumption is simplified even further. The two alternative sets of ideas are boiled down to two 
 5 
alternative theories of value. The justification of this simplification is that, on the one side, it 
is ultimately what people consider as valuable which shapes their attitudes, perceptions, and 
choices, while on the other side the two theories of value are much more narrowly defined and 
as such much more easy to compare than the much less disciplined notions of “sets of ideas”. 
Thus the hope is that what is lost in terms of realism due to the simplification is gained in 
terms of increased analytical discipline. 
Besides the two underlying assumptions, the paper is build as a case study of one 
country – Bulgaria. The reasons for this are two. There are some in-depth data available for 
this specific case of a postcommunist country, which demonstrate some large discrepancies 
between reality and perception. Such discrepancies are necessary to infer about the presence 
of one or another idea in people’s mental models. Second, a single country provides a 
relatively consistent single context and culture, which is valuable, because if context and 
culture also change, it becomes extremely difficult to disentangle the relevance of ideas. 
As a consequence of this reasoning, the paper is built as follows. First, some significant 
discrepancies between facts and perceptions, called the “experience gap”, are shown to exist 
in Bulgaria at the beginning of the 21st century. Second, two different ideas, namely two 
different theories of value, are presented, and the logic of how they shape perceptions is 
presented. Third, it is suggested that the presence of the experience gap may help infer about 
which of these two ideas has a stronger hold on the minds of Bulgarian economic agents, and 
the inference about which of the two ideas explains the presence of the experience gap is 
made. Fourth, since the presence of the experience gap is attributed to a specific economic 
idea, some of the effects of the experience gap can also be viewed as consequences of the 
continuing life of this idea. Finally, some conclusions are drawn and directions for 
overcoming the deficiencies of the analysis are offered. 
 
 6 
Part I. The Experience Gap in Bulgaria 
As of 2004, the Bulgarian transition can easily be split into two approximately equal, but 
politically and economically very different periods. The period between the end of 1989 and 
mid-1997 is characterized by political instability – four parliamentary elections, eight 
governments, none of which completed a full constitutional mandate – and by a severe drop 
on economic activity (per capita GDP fell by close to 30%) accompanied by repeated 
financial crises, high inflation, and rising unemployment. The period after mid-1997 is 
characterized by opposite tendencies – only one parliamentary election in 2001, 
correspondingly only two governments in power, lively economic recovery (by mid-2004 per 
capita GDP is back at its 1989 levels), increased incomes of most people and dropping 
poverty rate, including a distinct tendency for a drop in unemployment over the last four years 
of the period. In this second period the country applied for membership in EU and NATO, 
became a member of NATO, opened, conducted and completed negotiations for membership 
in the EU. 
Given the very sharp contrast between the two periods, one would expect to see a sharp 
contrast in the Bulgarians’ attitude towards what is happening in their country in the first 
period, and in the second. Such contrast, however, is difficult to find. The public opinion 
about what is happening and what is to be expected continues to be mostly pessimistic, the 
public trust in government and other institutions continues to be very low and declining, and 
people are generally not approving the direction in which the country is going. 
Obviously as of 2004 in Bulgaria perceptions differ from reality. Within the Bulgarian 
context, the phenomenon has been demonstrated by studies approaching the issue from 
different disciplines, such as anthropology, political science, sociology, and economics. The 
discrepancy will be shown in more detail for three specific indicators, which are to be used 
later in the analysis. 
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One particularly sharp discrepancy in Bulgaria during the period 1997-2004 is the one 
between the macroeconomic developments in the country and the public perceptions about the 
performance of the economy.iii The Bulgarian per capita GDP has recorded seven (between 
mid-1997 and mid-2004) years of consistent growth at close to 5 % per annum on average.iv 
Even if we accept all the criticisms of GDP as a measure of economic performance, this result 
leaves little doubt that the objective data point that the Bulgarian economy is performing very 
well and the overall economic situation is improving. At the same time the level of optimism 
about the future (positive answers to the question “Is Bulgaria changing for the better?” in the 
regular nationally representative sociological surveys of BBSS Gallup International) has gone 
down from close to 40 % in 1998 to about 19 % in 2003, with the decline being gradual and 
almost constant. Quite obviously the public perception is that the situation in Bulgaria is 
deteriorating. Seven years of objectively increasing economic activity have not changed 
perceptions in a positive direction, on the contrary – the discrepancy is increasing. This is a 
clear example of an experience gap – positive objective experience is associated with negative 
changes in perceptions. 
The second example of an experience gap in Bulgaria over the recent years is related to 
the first in that it is also based on the aggregate economic data. Not only the rising real GDP, 
but also rising real gross value added in most sectors, increased industrial output, sales and 
productivity, re-monetization of economic activity, and a large positive jump in the levels of 
foreign direct investmentv all clearly point that value-adding, positive-sum interactions have 
been prevalent in the Bulgarian economy over the seven years after the crisis of 1996-1997. 
An indirect indication of this development is the fact that a series of interviews, held in 2003, 
with Bulgarian entrepreneurs and foreign entrepreneurs working in Bulgariavi demonstrate 
that the members of the entrepreneurial elite notice increased opportunities and returns for 
positive-sum, cooperative interaction since around 1999. Yet three consecutive surveys of 
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nationally representative samples of respondents, conducted in 2000, 2001 and 2003,vii show 
that most Bulgarians tend to believe that in the economy someone’s gain is always someone 
else’s loss, i.e. that economic interaction is predominantly a zero-sum game. More concretely, 
the percentage of respondents who definitely or generally agree that “in the economy, the 
profit for some is always loss for others” has been 55.7, 56.9, and 51.0 percent for the 2000, 
2001, and 2003 surveys respectively, while the percentage of respondents generally or 
definitely disagreeing with this statement has been 18.2, 17.5, and 15.6 percent respectively. 
In short, the Bulgarian public continues to perceive the world as a zero-sum one even after 
seven years of clearly positive-sum reality. 
The third example of the experience gap in Bulgaria is the discrepancy between 
corruption reality, on the one hand, and corruption perception and expectations on the other. 
Corruption began being measured in Bulgaria in 1998 by the international anti-corruption 
organization Transparency International through its Bulgarian branch Transparency Without 
Borders, and by a national coalition of non-government organizations for fighting corruption, 
called Coalition 2000.viii Both organizations have recorded significant improvements for 
Bulgaria in terms of corruption reality. The Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index measures the opinion of members of the business and social elite, who are in a best 
position to recognize and observe corrupt practices, about the actual spread of such practices. 
On a scale where 0 means total corruption and 10 means no corruption, the Bulgarian index 
has gone from 2.9 in 1998 to 4.1 in 2004. This may not seem much, but it still represents one 
of the largest improvements among the Central and East European countries during the same 
period. Coalition 2000 measures corruption through a series of nationally representative 
sociological surveys, and includes questions about corruption pressure (public servants 
directly or indirectly asking for a bribe) and about corruption practices (paying a bribe). As of 
the spring of 2004, both measures have decreased significantly compared to the first survey in 
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1998. Yet, the very same Coalition 2000 surveys contain data that the public’s perceptions 
and expectations about the spread of corruption have stayed at the same relatively high level 
over the same period, even indicating a slight tendency to increase. Concretely, on a scale 
where 10 means total corruption and 0 means no corruption, the index of corruption pressure 
has gone down from 2.1 to 0.8, the index of corruption practices has gone down from 1.0 to 
0.3, while the index of the perceived spread of corruption has gone up from 5.9 to 6.3, and the 
index of corruption expectations has gone up from 5.0 to 5.5. A more formal look at these 
links shows that the correlation between the corruption reality variables (pressure and 
practices), and the corruption perception variables (perceived spread and expectations) is zero 
to negative.ix Thus the Bulgarian public seems convinced that corruption in the country is 
high and even rising despite the objectively measured, albeit modest, improvements in the 
actual corruption environment. 
Other examples of the experience gap can easily be found in present day Bulgaria, and 
not only in the sphere of the economy, but also in politics, security, crime. The three 
particular realizations of the experience gap in Bulgaria just described in more detail, 
however, allow for a comparison between the relevance of two specific economic ideas in 
terms of ability to explain the experience gap through their presence in the Bulgarian society. 
 
Part II. Two competing theories of value 
As already mentioned in the introduction, one of the simplifying assumptions of the 
present paper is that there are two possible candidates for a theory of value to which the 
present day Bulgarians may subscribe, and these two candidates are directly related two sets 
of ideas about the economy – one to the previously dominant Marxist views, and the other to 
the post-communist dominant market democracy paradigm. Inasmuch as these particular 
“theories” of value constitute easily explicable propositions through which people approach 
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political phenomena, they are considered to fit the notion of “ideas”, and the two terms are 
used interchangeably throughout the rest of the paper. 
The first theory of value, associated with Marxism, is the labor theory of value. It is very 
important to mention here that the Marxist labor theory of value is taken as a representative of 
the set of actually lived ideas in Bulgaria during the communist period. While it is true that 
Marx himself and many Marxist economies in the centrally planned economies developed 
complex and inventive extensions of this theory of value, which ultimately became quite 
sophisticated, what is of interest here is the general public’s view about value formed during 
life under communism. This view is quite naturally relatively simplistic and dogmatic. Below, 
it is presented exactly the way it was presented to the author in a course on Marxist political 
economy for law students in the 1980s. 
In short, the labor theory of value described here does not pretend to correspond to the 
sophisticated Marxist theoretical volumes, but to the way the idea was actually lived during 
communist Bulgaria. Its basic conjecture is that the value of things is due solely to the labor 
input in their production. Nothing outside labor adds value to anything, and one can readily 
measure the value of any good by calculating the amount of labor which went into its 
production and delivery to the final consumer. Accordingly, everyone should be rewarded 
according to their labor input. 
The labor theory of value requires a bit of explanation. In fact, it is not immanently 
Marxist. It was simply the dominant among economists theory of value during the first half of 
the 19th century, which Marx basically took for granted. In fact, well known economists such 
as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill also accepted the labor theory of value. The 
difference between them and Marx was in their attitude towards the idea. The labor theory of 
value emerged as a concept in response to other theories of value over the several centuries 
before Adam Smith – most notably the physiocrats with their claim that only land creates 
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value and all the value in the economy comes from land. The labor theory of value was an 
intellectual answer to that claim, but it had the same weaknesses as the land theory of value, 
and most classical economists were well aware of that. They recognized the limitations of the 
theory and only used it as the best available instrument for furthering economic analysis. This 
instrument was to be abolished the very moment something better emerged, as indeed it did 
only several decades after Marx’s writings. Marx, however, took the labor theory of value to 
represent the final and ultimate truth. For him it was not an imperfect but necessary 
instrument, it became the central idea around which a whole ideology was developed. 
To show how central the labor theory of value is for Marxist analytical results and 
policy prescriptions, it suffices to look at the link between the labor theory of value and the 
Marxist attitude towards capital, property, exploitation and the role of the proletariat. If only 
labor adds value, then people who do not work should be able to obtain goods only if people 
who work give them some voluntarily. If there is no such voluntary donation, and still 
someone who doesn’t work gets income and is able to consume goods, he must be stealing 
from the workers. Capitalists and landowners do not work, they just own means of production 
– but it is not the means of production that add value, it is only the labor. Ownership of means 
of production should not entitle the owners to an income stream, because means of production 
do not add value, yet owners of means of production do get income, and quite large at that. 
Thus the only reasonable explanation of ownership is that through it people who do not work 
are able to appropriate the value created by the workers. Ownership is theft. This theft is 
forced on the workers through exploitation – the forceful taking of value created by their 
labor. The only way to remedy the situation is to ban private property over means of 
production, because it immediately follows from the labor theory of value that private 
property over means of production is always and only an unproductive instrument for 
predation. Such a ban cannot be easily imposed, because the class of exploiters has resources 
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to resist, and is not shy about using violence for the purpose, therefore the solution is that the 
working class enforces the ban on private property through taking over power and using force 
in the form of dictatorship of the proletariat. Approximately the same logic goes for the price 
system – prices, like private property, under the labor theory of value can be explained only as 
an instrument for theft and exploitation, and should also be abolished in favor of an 
administrative, under the supervision of the proletariat, system of counting and calculating 
labor, so that during socialism “everyone receives according to their labor”. 
None of these conclusions and policy prescriptions can hold if the labor theory of value 
is dropped, or at least recognized as limited and imperfect. Over the century and a half after 
Marx the economic science has developed and offered another theory of value, which 
dominates the labor theory of value on two fronts. First, it is able to incorporate the input of 
not only labor, but also of other factors of production, in the creation of value and the 
satisfaction of human needs. These other factors are land, capital, and (depending on the 
school of thought) entrepreneurship. All of them add value, and the contribution of each is 
important and cannot be neglected if the theory of value is to be coherent. The second front on 
which the present day theory of value dominates the labor theory of value, is that it takes into 
consideration the demand side of economic transactions, which is completely ignored by 
Marxism. Who wants what, what human needs get satisfied, how much the final consumers 
subjectively value what is offered to them, is important, and cannot be ignored if the theory of 
value is to be coherent. This present day theory of value, which makes a valiant attempt to 
hold account of both the contribution of every factor of production and the size of the human 
need that is being satisfied by a given good, is the market price theory of value. It claims that 
the only coherent theory of value is the market price, and that the market price, obtained 
under conditions of competition and private property, is the only relatively decent 
approximation of the true value of things. Of course, this theory is well known to have 
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limitations of its own, and the conditions necessary for market prices to be a good 
approximation of the true value do not always hold. But by and large, the market price theory 
of value is accepted today by the economic profession as a useful tool for analysis and for 
policy prescriptions. And, contrary to Marxism, these policy prescriptions definitely demand 
the existence of private property (with the corresponding efficiency incentives) and of 
markets where prices are formed in free and voluntary interaction between many suppliers 
and many demanders. 
In conclusion, it is easy to see that the labor theory of value and the market price theory 
of value lead to very different, even completely opposite, policy prescriptions. What is 
supposed to be abolished, banned, and prosecuted under the first idea, is to be actively built, 
grown, and fostered under the second. From the point of view of this paper, one and the same 
reality is likely to be evaluated in a radically different way by people who subscribe, even if 
not openly, to the first idea, and by people who accept the second. Accordingly, the 
discrepancies between reality and personal subjective evaluations of this reality in Bulgaria, 
described above, can offer a good way to make inferences about which of the two competing 
ideas is more likely to inform the perceptions of the Bulgarians. If one of the ideas is able to 
explain the experience gaps, while the other has difficulties explaining them, it is the first idea 
to which may be a majority of Bulgarians subscribe. 
 
Part III. Which theory explains the Bulgarian experience gaps better? 
The central question of this part of the paper is whether we can make an inference about 
the degree to which the two theories of value, described in Part II, can help explain the three 
experience gaps in Bulgaria, described in Part I, and whether we can compare this degree. 
This is done by looking at each experience gap in turn. 
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The gap between the Bulgarian economic growth since 1997 and the increasing social 
pessimism about the direction, in which the country is going, cannot be explained in very 
simple terms due to the different sources of pessimism. However, the level of pessimism is 
only to some extent attributable to the responses of people who have objective reasons to 
believe that their lives are not going to improve – mostly the elderly and the respondents with 
very low education. The true dominance of the pessimistic outlook can be attributedx to 
people who are improving their personal well-being over the last years, but still believe the 
country is in collapse. These respondents provide a relatively clear picture of what they would 
count as a “valid” evidence for economic development in the country. More or less it boils 
down to “industry, plants, and smokestacks”. The economic development model in the minds 
of these respondents is one of large scale heavy industrialization, especially in sectors of 
massive production involving huge investments such as chemicals, machine-building, etc. Yet 
the Bulgarian GDP growth is not generated by these sectors, and over most of the period 
1997-2004 these sectors have been in decline. The sectors that have ignited and maintained 
growth are mostly in the services (tourism, telecommunications, financial services) and light 
industry (textiles, apparel, furniture, footwear). Obviously in the minds of the respondents, 
these sectors, even if providing growth for now, cannot sustain it, they are not seen as worthy 
causes of longer term economic development. Hence the pessimism in the face of growth. 
Heavy industrialization with massive and huge investments is precisely one of the 
prescriptions of socialism, based on the labor theory of value. The more means of production 
there are, the more labor can be applied to them and the more value created. In this theory, 
means of production are treated as “past labor” – the bigger the industrial complexes, the 
larger this store of past labor, waiting for some fresh labor to produce final goods and higher 
standard of living. In fact, the whole “communist” nirvana can be described in these terms – 
communism is actually a state of affairs when so much past labor has been “piled-up” into 
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productive capacity, that next to no new fresh labor is needed for this productive capacity to 
produce enough goods to satisfy everyone’s needs. And huge industrial complexes are the 
embodiment of past labor accumulation. Ergo, if we do not see huge industrial complexes 
being built, the growth of the past seven years can be viewed as an insignificant anomaly and 
the country will imminently collapse, the only question being when. The labor theory of value 
can explain the Bulgarian pessimism in the midst of economic growth. 
The market price theory cannot. According to the market price theory of value, while 
investment is important for the long term growth prospects, it is definitely not required to be 
in large and easy to see piles of past labor, and is also definitely not required to be in specific, 
a-priori defined sectors. Resources should flow towards the spheres of economic activity 
which market prices indicate as most profitable, i.e. as satisfying the most human needs with 
the least resource use. If this turns out to be small hotels on the sea side or sneakers, so be it. 
The important thing is the growth to be based on increased factor productivity and not to rely 
on unsustainable deficits. This is precisely what has been happening in the Bulgarian 
economy over the seven years in question – there have been growth sectors, resources are 
flowing into them, and there have been no unsustainable deficits. All the data have been clear 
on this point. So no one who believes in the market price theory of value has reasons to 
believe that the Bulgarian economy is doomed to collapse. 
The two theories of value compared here are also clearly distinct with respect to beliefs 
about whether economic interaction is a zero-sum or a positive-sum game. Under the market 
price theory of value, positive-sum, as well as negative-sum, interactions are entirely possible 
depending on the institutional setting of the market exchange and on the incentive structure at 
a particular place at a particular moment between specific economic agents. What value is 
created depends on total factor productivity and on what human needs are satisfied, and these 
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change through time. So, people who believe in the market price theory of value should 
recognize positive-sum interaction when they see it. 
This is not the case with people who believe in the labor theory of value. This is a 
consequence of the fact that value is completely defined by the amount of labor, and the 
amount of labor is exogenously (demographically) given, regardless of whether it is past labor 
embodied in some means of production, or raw labor ready to be applied to these means of 
production. If labor is exogenously given, so is value, and the only question is how much of 
the exogenously given value goes to whom. This is a clear case of a zero-sum interaction. For 
people who believe in the labor theory of value, a decreasing economic activity is almost 
unacceptable as a notion – if their incomes are dropping, it is because someone is stealing 
from them, and stealing much more than before. And if economic growth is reported while 
employment is either dropping or having negligibly small increases, it is most likely because 
someone is “cooking” the numbers. Indeed, beliefs and stories about how in the early 1990s 
the Bulgarian “riches” were “stolen” by a select few, and how the National Statistic has been 
“misreporting” the Bulgarian macroeconomic data are easy to find and seem to be convincing 
for a significantly large number of people. The labor theory of value has no problems with 
zero-sum perceptions, on the contrary – it causes them, and makes them resilient to 
contradicting signals from the actual world. 
Finally, the two theories of value have very different explanatory power with respect to 
the corruption experience gap as well. One of the explanations for this gapxi is the relationship 
between the definition of corruption, which people actually subscribe to, and the nature of the 
transition process. More concretely, people define corruption as the very nature of exercising 
of power, and the exercise of power during transition includes privatization and opening of 
space for private initiative. This is the reason why the Bulgarian Privatization Agency is 
considered by the public at large, which has never dealt with the Agency personally in any 
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significant way, as one of the most corrupt entities in the country, while the businesspeople 
who have had dealings with the Agency, regardless of whether these dealings were successful 
for the businesspeople or not, tend to think that the Agency is far less corrupt. 
In the Bulgarians’ minds, the exercise of power is stealing from the people through the 
state, and the ultimate embodiment of this stealing is privatization. When they give their 
opinion about the present and future spread of corruption, they do not think about how many 
times someone asked for a bribe or how many times they offered a bribe, but about the fact 
that the state is privatizing its assets, and what was previously “ours” is becoming, and will 
continue to become “someone else’s”. This view has no conflict whatsoever with the notion 
that private property is theft. On the contrary, if someone believes in the labor theory of value, 
then privatization (not only of economic entities, but of the whole process of decision making 
in the society) is corruption (stealing through the state) by definition. The more this process 
goes on, the broader the spread of corruption. 
The market price theory of value cannot fill the corruption experience gap even half as 
well as the labor theory of value. Postcommunist privatization, under this theory, is sine qua 
non for economic development and rising living standards, and it cannot be regarded, in itself, 
as damaging or undesirable. At the same time, economic development also requires 
institutional organization of the market interaction, and corruption can be viewed as a 
weakness of the institutional framework. People who subscribe to the market price theory of 
value should tend to adopt an institutional definition of corruption, and should look for 
measures of institutional performance to judge the present and future spread of corruption, 
rather than assume an existentialist definition of corruption as the very nature of exercise of 
power in postcommunism. Therefore believers in the market price theory of value should not 
preserve and even rise their perceived level of the spread of corruption when at the same time 
they encounter less corruption pressure, and are forced into fewer corrupt acts. 
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All three examples lead to a definite conclusion. The labor theory of value can easily 
explain all three experience gaps in Bulgaria described here, while the market price theory of 
value cannot be seen as having any explanatory power. The experience gaps cannot be 
“filled” if we accept that most Bulgarians adopt the market price theory of value. They are 
readily “filled” if we allow for the labor theory of value to continue occupying the minds of a 
significantly large number of Bulgarians. 
 
Part IV. The importance of the experience gap 
The fact that one of the two theories explains the experience gap better that the other 
would not have much significance if the experience gap was just an observational oddity in 
Bulgaria and did not have consequences for the country’s development. However, it does. An 
in-depth analysis of the policy challenges facing Bulgaria, as well as other postcommunist 
countries in Southeastern Europexii indicates that the experience gap affects public support for 
implementation and deepening of further economic reforms, which are a necessary condition 
for the long-run sustainability of economic growth in the whole region. Since Bulgaria is one 
of the reform leaders of the region, its experience is all the more relevant and important. 
The presence of the experience gap involves two major risks. First, it causes pessimism, 
which in turn affects individual agents’ decisions about the future, especially their decisions 
how much to save. Inasmuch as domestic saving is a major determinant of long term 
investment, capital accumulation, productivity and from there standard of living, the 
experience gap can be expected to affect long term growth. Second, the experience gap leads 
to falling public support for reformist governments, because the public does not perceive the 
fruits of the implemented reforms. Thus liberalization, privatization, and the institutional 
building of the framework necessary for the respective economy to sustain its growth 
increasingly depends only on foreign conditionality, which makes it unstable and possibly 
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unsustainable. An especially damaging side effect is alienation from democracy and a certain 
level of de-socialization. Thus the presence of the experience gap endangers both economic 
and political opening and streamlining of the respective postcommunist society. It becomes a 
policy concern and affects the lives of people. 
Ultimately, the conjecture is that at the beginning of the 21st century in Bulgaria there is 
a significant experience gap between real developments in society and the economy and 
people’s perceptions about these developments. The existence of this gap can easily be 
explained with the continuous presence of one of the pillars of Marxist ideology, namely the 
labor theory of value, in the minds of a sufficiently large number of people. At the same time, 
the experience gap affects the set of choices facing both individuals and social decision 
makers in Bulgaria, and thus shapes their present and future lives and opportunities. In short, 
even though the once dominant Marxist set of ideas itself has long ago completely left the 
domain of the Bulgaria public discourse, through the continuous life of the labor theory of 
value Marxism continues to play a role in present day Bulgaria and to be a presence to be 
reckoned with. 
 
Conclusion 
The present paper gives a negative answer to the question whether Marxism has indeed 
abruptly and completely disappeared from Bulgaria over the first several years of its 
postcommunist transition, as its vanishing from the policy discourse would tend to indicate. 
While no one would suggest any policies resting on the postulates and policy prescriptions of 
Marxism and this particular set of ideas has definitely left the public discussions in Bulgaria, 
the Marxist labor theory of value continues to live in people’s minds and still shapes today’s 
Bulgarian reality. This is not the result of resilient fanatics preserving an idea, neither the 
consequence of a grand postcommunist conspiracy. It is a simple effect of the fact that 
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societies are inertial systems, and that ideas which have been taught and have dominated for 
at least two generations of a given society cannot simply vanish without a trace and at least 
some of them are bound to continue living, modified and transformed by the complex human 
mind, despite anybody’s will, plan, or action. 
Of course, the analysis offered here is necessarily limited. It tells the story of only one 
country, and can hardly serve for sweeping generalizations, but it can hopefully inspire other 
such context-rich careful looks at other postcommunist countries. It also rests on the 
assumption that only two sets of ideas “compete” for the minds of the Bulgarian people after 
the fall of communism. This is not necessarily so, as the adamant struggles of many Bulgarian 
thinkers and policy makers in the early 1990s to find a “third” way between pure socialism 
and what was deemed as market fundamentalism. These thinkers and policy makers, however, 
never produced an alternative theory nearly as coherent as Marxism or the theory behind 
market democracy, so valid disciplined comparisons are next to impossible. This analytical 
weakness can be overcome by more carefully defining realistic alternatives and more 
precisely defining hypotheses in this more complicated analytical environment. 
Finally, the fact that the labor theory of value can explain the Bulgarian experience gaps 
so much better than the market price theory of value can be a pure coincidence. However, if 
we accept that reality is shaped by ideas, and that there is a role of ideas at all in society, the 
experience gap has to be explained through the workings, however deep under the surface, of 
some idea or set of ideas. So far for the case of Bulgaria, Marxism, through the labor theory of 
value, is a very good candidate. 
                                                 
i
 The phrase “market-capitalistic talk” is intentionally loose. It tries to convey that this talk, while vaguely based 
on the belief that markets and incentives are important for economic well-being, is often undisciplined and 
inconsistent. Using a more disciplined and well defined term, such as “neo-liberal”, or “Washington consensus”, 
for the case of Bulgaria in this period would be highly inappropriate. 
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ii
 In the case of Bulgaria, this set of ideas cannot and should not be attributed only to communism and Marxism. 
These ideas were dominant in the Bulgarian economic thinking long before the communist takeover, and 
provided a hospitable environment for its intellectual flourishing. See Roumen Avramov, “Notes on economic 
science in Bulgaria,” in Petya Kabakchieva and Roumen Avramov, eds., “East”-“West” cultural encounters. 
Entrepreneurship, governance, economic knowledge (Sofia: Iztok Zapad, 2004) 311-360, and the numerous 
references cited therein. 
iii
 See Association Global Bulgaria Intitative, Optimistic theory about the pessimism of the transition (Sofia, 
2003-2004), Graph on p. 1. Downloadable at: http://www.cls-
sofia.org/publications/papers/Optimistic_Theory_about_the_Pessimism_of_the_Transition-EN.pdf  
iv
 Source: National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria (www.nsi.bg). 
v
 The relevant data can be found at National Statistical Institute (www.nsi.bg), the Bulgarian National Bank 
(www.bnb.bg), and the Bulgarian Investment Agency (www.investbg.government.bg).  
vi
 See Georgy Ganev, “Entrepreneurial attitudes and responses to EU accession in Bulgaria: two possible 
scenarios”, in Petya Kabakchieva and Roumen Avramov, eds., “East”-“West” cultural encounters. 
Entrepreneurship, governance, economic knowledge (Sofia: Iztok Zapad, 2004) 135. 
vii
 The surveys have been conducted for various projects of the Centre for liberal strategies in Sofia, and have 
been financially supported by the Civic Education Project and the German Marshall Fund (2000 and 2001 
surveys), and by the European Commission (grant No. CT-2002-00131, project: “Functional Borders and 
Sustainable Security: Integrating the Balkans in the European Union (IBEU), 2003 survey). 
viii
 More on these organizations can be found at www.transparency.org and www.anticorruption.bg respectively. 
These sites also contain the data quoted here. 
ix
 See Ivan Krastev and Georgy Ganev, “The missing incentive: corruption, anticorruption, and reelection”, in 
Janos Kornai and Susan Rose-Ackerman, eds., Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 162, Table 8.2. 
x
 See Association Global Bulgaria Intitative, Optimistic theory, 22-25, esp. Table on 23-24. 
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xi
 See Krastev and Ganev, The missing incentive, 165-168. 
xii
 Center for Policy Studies, Central European University, In search of responsive government. State building 
and economic growth in the Balkans (Budapest, 2004) final paper of the “Blue bird – agenda for civil society in 
Southeast Europe” project: www.ceu.hu/cps/bluebird/pap/pub_polstud_bluebird.pdf  
